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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines personnel resources for space support currently 
available to Division and Brigade commanders while recommending methods to 
provide those resources more efficiently. Current standardized space support for 
Divisions and Brigades exists in the Space Support Element (SSE).  When first 
envisioned, the SSE provided organic space capabilities to the lowest practical 
tactical level, but as requirements evolved, the need for full time space staff at 
those levels has diminished.  Space capabilities are currently found on the 
Division staff and at the brigade level, but the amount of time spent by space 
operations officers on space has dwindled to very low levels.  Personnel with 
minimal training can provide the limited amount of space knowledge needed on a 
permanent basis.  Rather than maintain organic space staff, a more effective use 
of those personnel would be to assign them to Army Space Support Teams 
(ARSST) where they would spend more time on space-related duties.  This 
thesis provides three key recommendations to improve utilization of Army space 
personnel.  The first is to educate leadership on how space can impact 
operations.  The second broadens the Army Space Cadre to utilize space skilled 
staff officers other than FA40s and develop an enlisted space specialty. The final 
recommendation is to reallocate SSE personnel to enhance the ARSST model of 
space support. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
One of the primary benefits of space capabilities when delivered to tactical 
commanders is that they greatly enhance battlefield situational awareness.  
Many equipment platforms have been developed to provide these products to the 
lowest possible levels.  To provide personnel expertise, the Space Support 
Element (SSE) emplaced space-educated operations officers down as low as the 
Brigade Combat Team.  Although utilization of space operations officers at 
Division and Brigade levels ensured a point of presence for the space community 
in combat units, and initially, these officers provided valuable knowledge that 
influenced operations, as missions change the utility of having full-time space 
staff reaches a point of diminishing returns. This thesis examines the 
effectiveness of that approach and recommends methods that provide the same 
level of service more efficiently.   
Current standardized space support for the Division and Brigade exists in 
the form of the Space Support Element (SSE).  When first envisioned the SSE 
was designed to provide organic space capabilities to the lowest practical tactical 
level, but as requirements have evolved, the need for full time space staff at 
those levels has diminished.  Space capabilities are now found in several 
different areas of the Division staff and the amount of time spent by space 
operations officers on space has dwindled to very low levels.  Highly advanced 
systems have been developed to provide intelligence, communication, and early 
warning through specially trained individuals scattered among the various staff 
elements.  The use of these systems requires only limited space officer 
interaction.  Personnel with minimal training can provide the limited amount of 
space knowledge needed on a permanent basis.  Rather than maintain organic 
space staff that are only moderately employed, a more effective use of those 
personnel is to assign them to Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs).  The 
ARSST concept of dedicated space teams deploying in support of Army 
operations is a more efficient utilization of the Army Space Cadre.  The main 
 xviii
advantage of the ARSST concept is the continual exposure to space and  
insider access to the 1st Space Brigade’s resources.  
This thesis proposes three key recommendations to improve the overall 
utilization of Army space personnel.  The first recommendation is to educate 
leadership on ways space can affect operations.  This is accomplished through 
senior leader education, but also with an officer-training program that 
emphasizes promoting space within tactical units. A key component of the 
training outreach involves emplacing FA40 trainers within National Training 
Centers to train deploying units in the applications of space to their mission. The 
second is to broaden the Army Space Cadre to utilize space skilled staff officers 
outside the space operations officer career field and develop an enlisted space 
operations specialty.  This recommendation includes subordinate portions 
including the expansion of the FA40 community into an enlisted specialty and an 
FA40 acquisition specialty. The final recommendation is to reallocate SSE 
members to enhance the ARSST model of space support.  This shift in personnel 
would ensure the space-related proficiency of the total career field is greatly 
improved and a larger stable of ready teams are available to support Division and 
Brigade activities.  
 xix
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I. ORIGINS OF TACTICAL SPACE 
DESERT STORM was a significant landmark for application of military 
space-based capabilities.  Prior to DESERT STORM space was considered 
primarily a strategic tool with only limited usability for troops in a tactical 
environment.  Since the dawn of the Information Age, space served the 
government as either a means of providing strategic national security or global 
communications capability.  DESERT STORM demonstrated for the first time that 
there were many ways to utilize space beneficial to tactical commanders on the 
ground.  The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force noted in 1991, that it “was the 
first large scale opportunity for our forces in the field to understand that space 
systems are vital to their success.” 1  The gains for forces on the battlefield were 
numerous.  Space capabilities provided global communications, intelligence 
resources, and the ability to see enemy dispositions on a very large scale.  
Although those resources remained largely unavailable to the lower echelon 
forces, such as companies and platoons, they were used for planning purposes 
as low as the battalion level.2  In some respects, the amount of availability would 
be considered inadequate by current standards.  For the timeframe considered, 
however, they were groundbreaking and cutting edge. 
The years leading from 1991 to the initial invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Global War on Terror included many technological advancements as well as 
shifts in doctrine for the use of space assets throughout the military.  Information 
technology dependence, including both satellite communications and space 
intelligence applications established during DESERT STORM increased in 
seeming parallel with Moore’s Law.  Although tactical military systems lagged 
behind commercially available ones, space access became more available than 
                                            
1 JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 
August 2002, II-4. 
2 Rodger S. Pitt, 2008. Realities of the Space Age & the Realities of Carl von Clausewitz’s 
Theories of “Fog and Friction.” Army Space Journal 7(2): 55. 
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ever before.  The introduction of space into military planning, operations, and 
doctrine in the post-DESERT STORM culture was a significant milestone in 
tactical space. 
The Army determined that it needed space-trained professionals in the 
mid-1990s due mainly to its increasing requirement to use space to accomplish 
varying missions.  Key among the users of space within the Army was the Space 
and Missile Defense Command (SMDC).  The primary mission of SMDC is to 
ensure the nation’s missile defense capability.  Additionally, SMDC serves as the 
Army proponent for space and high altitude operations.  They are the main point 
of focus within the Army on space.3  Therein lies the source of some of the 
difficulties in the proper application of space in the Army.  The Army’s primary 
voice for space is not dedicated to space as its primary mission.  Rather, the 
SMDC senior leadership is comprised of many Air Defense Artillery (ADA) 
officers due to a history of involvement in missile defense.  
Space operations, as understood in the current Army, are founded on the 
guidance and doctrine established by SMDC.  Chief among the contributions of 
SMDC is the formation of the Army’s professional space cadre.  That cadre 
began as Army officers and civilians who had worked in the space field, but 
rapidly evolved into a new career specialty known as Functional Area 40 (FA40).  
First established in 1998, the FA40s initially served within strategic organizations 
both joint and Army centric.  The events of September 11 had repercussions 
around the government, but especially in the Army space field.  The Global War 
on Terror fueled a spirit of modularization and modernization within the Army that 
redesigned the way the entire Army was structured.  GEN Schoomaker, the Army 
Chief of Staff at the time, conceived of a modular Army with widely varying 
assets and capabilities available in brigade-sized elements known as Brigade 
Combat Teams (BCTs).  These BCTs would include all of the assets they would 
                                            
3 Space and Missile Defense Command, 2009. What is SMDC/ARSTRAT? Army 
Organizational Website. 
http://www.army.mil/institution/organization/unitsandcommands/commandstructure/smdc/ 
(accessed January 4, 2009). 
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need to wage war anywhere in the world.  Previously, deploying units were 
“sliced” together from many different places to form a collage of capabilities to 
accomplish a specific mission.  BCTs would have their own organic capabilities 
for any mission.  For example, they would have their own communications, 
intelligence, logistics, and security assets.  The impact on the space community 
was an initiative to put those capabilities in tactical units for the first time.  In 
2002, the Army explored the concept of putting FA40s and organic space 
capabilities outside of the strategic world in an exercise called MILLENNIUM 
CHALLENGE 2002 (MC02).  During MC02, an organic space section was 
attached to the 82nd Airborne Division in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The result 
of those experiments was the genesis of the Space Support Element (SSE).  The 
SSE’s mission was to support commanders at Army Corps and Division levels 
with FA40 space trained officers and an internal space capability that belonged to 
the supported unit all of the time. 4  
In the years following the initial establishment of SSEs, several forays into 
lower level units attempt to bring space access closer to the tactical commanders 
and soldiers directly using the resources.  The focus of this thesis is on the space 
capabilities that are available for Army tactical commanders.  Specifically, the 
thesis will explore the space capabilities available for Division and Brigade 
commanders and the utilization of the Army professional space cadre assigned 
to those units.  The end state of this research is to examine the assets those 
levels of command currently employ and to determine the best way to employ 
both the space resources and the Army’s space-educated FA-40 personnel.  
Along the way, a description of how personnel staffing and space equipment 
evolved will provide insight into the problems associated with the way FA40s are 
currently used.  
This thesis is divided into two major portions: a survey of space equipment 
and an organizational study of operational staffing.  Space equipment spans the 
                                            
4 Strategic Missile Defense Command, US Army Space Support Element (SSE) History 
1998-2006: From Concept to Combat Capability (brief, Peterson AFB, CO, October 2006). 
 4
development, most current capabilities, and forecasts for the modular tactical 
space systems employed throughout the Army.  The varied applications 
combined with the most current technology empower tactical users to explore 
space products unavailable as recently as five years ago.  Space staffing 
explores the use of FA40 Space Operations Officers.  Through a survey of 
officers currently serving as SSEs around the Army, an in-depth study of how 
decisions are made to develop SSE positions and the development of SSE 
doctrine, a greater understanding of tactical space becomes visible.  Blending 
knowledge of capabilities, staffing, doctrine, and tactical needs, a final 
recommendation of the most effective use of FA40 personnel and resources for 
tactical commanders becomes identifiable. 
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II. TACTICAL SPACE CAPABILITIES 
The purpose of this section is to clarify requirements from a tactical 
commander’s standpoint and detail capabilities that currently exist.  Capabilities 
range from Military Satellite Communications to navigation and intelligence-
gathering systems and will be covered in detail.  Some effort is also made to 
discuss future trends as they impact space operations.  The result will be a solid 
understanding of not only what the modern tactical commander wants, but also 
how they get the things they need.  
Any thorough examination of capabilities begins with a study of 
requirements.  As Stanley Weiss and Michael Williams state in Space Mission 
Analysis and Design, “all requirements must begin with succinct, but well defined 
user and customer mission needs.” 5  The significance for tactical space systems 
is no different from any other system in that the problem starts with a user’s 
needs.  A tactical commander wants to accomplish their mission and uses tools 
in order to do so.  Space assets provide a possible tool, but perhaps not the only 
tool.  As common sense sounding as it is, the best way to help commanders 
achieve mission success is to analyze what they need and then determine how 
best to handle the problem.  
Often the tools available are not correct fits for an actual mission.  The 
tools may be comprised of antiquated equipment left over from an older era when 
the unit had a different mission.  A good example of this can be seen in the use 
of Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE).  MSE is a communications system 
developed in the 1980s using primarily line of sight radio systems and providing 
primarily voice communications. 6  When OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
began in 2003 the inability of MSE equipment to deliver acceptable bandwidth 
                                            
5 Wiley J. Larson, and James R. Wertz, eds, 1999. Space and Mission Analysis and Design. 
El Segundo, CA: Space Technology Library: 73. 
6 Rebecca R. Raines, 1996. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. 
Army Signal Corps. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History: 349. 
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created a substantial requirement vs. capability gap.  The requirements in 1980 
called for the ability to “talk” anywhere on the battlefield making voice the focus of 
most tactical communication effort.  The disparity is demonstrated keenly in a 
2003 Army Signal Center produced briefing that described a successful 
communications network being composed of 93% voice, 7% data, and 0% 
video.7  This briefing reflects an inability to see that voice capabilities had already 
been eclipsed by data in terms of relevance, but were still being featured as the 
main driver behind tactical networks.  Voice was no longer the high demand 
commodity it had been in 1980.  Data communications had become far more 
important and the use of data products far more common so any study focusing 
on a heavily voice skewed network was antiquated.  Yet, requirements 
developed from 1980-era communication gaps still existed as recently as the 
2003 briefing.  For OIF, commanders needed large bandwidth products in the 
form of images, presentations, and video.  They could use them from facilities 
connected to the main network, but could not use them in tactical environments 
using MSE.  The available equipment was simply not capable of fulfilling the 
mission requirements.  Major changes were required for the Army to develop the 
tactical communications capabilities to match the requirements of the tactical 
commanders. 8  It is, therefore, vital to ensure the equipment or systems used to 
solve a problem actually solve the current problem and not a previous one. 
There is a symbiotic relationship between capabilities and requirements.  
Clearly, having solid mission based requirements is key to a successful 
capability.  This is true whether developing a networking system or a space 
operations platform.  The varied means by which commanders use space 
systems to accomplish their mission is also important.  Having a large stable of 
space options available, but either not using them or using them ineffectively can 
adversely affect mission accomplishment on a local level and impact the success 
                                            
7 Kevin J. Cogan and Ray DeLucio, 2004. Network Centric Warfare Case Study: U.S. V 
Corps and Third Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom Combat Operations (March - 
April 2003. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: 22.  
8.Ibid., 7. 
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of entire programs on a national level.  The proper application of a capability for 
its intended mission ensures that the commander’s intent is achieved and 
ultimately the unit’s goals and the nation’s goals as well. 
A. TACTICAL COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS 
Commanders at the Division or Brigade level have many uses for space 
on the modern battlefield.  A warfighting commander needs to answer the same 
questions today that commanders have asked since the time of the Spartans.  
Namely, where am I, where are my troops, where is the enemy, what is the 
enemy doing, how do I communicate orders to my troops, and what 
environmental effects are possible to influence the outcome of the battle?  In 
those Hellenistic years, many of these questions were easily answered by a 
physical glance around the battlefield from a high vantage point.  This is probably 
best exemplified by Alexander the Great in the battle of Gaugamela.  Alexander 
positioned himself on a hilltop, assessed Darius III’s Persian force movements, 
directed the movement of his own forces, and finally led a charge to what he 
determined to be the decisive spot.9  Some would argue that Napoleon’s 
contribution to the conduct of war was to add a new level of strategic intelligence 
and situational awareness.  Systematic intelligence gathering was completed 
through his Statistical Bureau for strategic information and an efficient internal 
Imperial Headquarters staff for tactical events.  Van Crevald states that “almost 
as many means were employed then as today: newspapers were systematically 
collected and translated, spies and agents were planted in every important city 
and used the imperial mail for forwarding coded messages.”10  For many 
historians, the Napoleonic era of warfare was the origin of the modern 
intelligence network.  Tactical needs for commanders change very little over 
time.  It can be said that only methods, quality, and quantity change.  
                                            
9 Martin Van Crevald, 1985. Command in War. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press: 
44. 
10 Ibid., 66. 
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The modern commander has many of the same requirements as 
Napoleon, but uses much more technologically advanced methods.  Today’s 
tactical commander needs to know a wide range of facts with near real time 
speed.  For example, they need to know where their own, other friendly forces, 
and enemy forces are located with great precision.  This can give a tactical 
overview of the current situation and prevents possible fratricide.  In a divergence 
from eighteenth century commanders, the modern commander must keep a 
vigilant eye on weapons of mass destruction that can come in the form of ballistic 
missiles.  The prediction of weather can also be helpful for commanders to 
determine strategy or other system effects.  Weather’s effects can be measured 
in its impact to planned operations, the ability to collect intelligence, and effects 
on communications systems.  Through the use of intelligence satellites or other 
intelligence means, the locations and intent of enemy forces can be determined.  
High bandwidth capacity communications satellites can provide a commander 
the ability to both speak down to the lowest level of their command or as far up 
the chain of command as the White House.  Each of these factors play into the 
situational awareness of the commander and the role that space and the FA-40 
plays and will be covered in detail. 
B. MILSATCOM 
The use of satellites to communicate over long distances can be traced to 
the early 1960s.  As explained earlier, they did not truly become a major force 
multiplier in tactical operations until DESERT STORM. 11  Today, Division and 
Brigade commanders use MILSATCOM in several different ways.  Satellite 
communications can come in the form of high capacity access to data and voice; 
small portable devices permitting limited data and voice, and small commercial 
services using telephones that are highly portable. 
 
                                            
11 JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 
August 2002, II-4. 
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1. Defense Satellite Communication System 
High capacity services imply a level of access to global networks that 
enables commanders to use any products they can obtain from non-tactical 
environments.  The main system in operation for long-haul high bandwidth 
communications is the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS).  The 
DSCS program has been evolving since the 1960s and is currently up to DSCS 
III Service Life Enhancement Program (DSCS III SLEP).  The last DSCS III 
satellite was launched in August 2003.  DSCS operates in the Super High 
Frequency band specifically within the frequency ranges of 7.25 to 7.75 GHz for 
downlink and 7.9 to 8.4 GHz for uplink transmissions.  The total data throughput 
of a single DSCS III SLEP yields 250 Mbps.   
Tactical units are able to access the DSCS system through the use of 
Ground Mobile Forces (GMF) terminals.  The primary GMF terminals supporting 
DSCS are the AN/TSC-93D, shown in Figure 1, and the AN/TSC-85D, shown in 
Figure 2.  The “D” model enables the unit to take advantage of SLEP upgrades to 
the DSCS architecture.   
 
Figure 1.   AN-TSC-93D12 
[From The Army Satellite Communications Architecture Book] 
                                            
12 U.S. Army 25E Training Course Handbook, 2008. The Army Satellite Communications 
Architecture Book. January 2008. U.S. Army Signal Center, Fort Gordon, GA: 6-164. 
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The TSC-93D and TSC-85D are both capable of establishing links with a 
throughput of 2048 kbps.  The main difference between the two assemblages is 
the number of links available.  The TSC-85D is designed to function as a “hub” at 
a Corps or higher headquarters with a capability of establishing five links and a 
total throughput of 10 Mbps.13  The TSC-93D is generally at a Division 
headquarters and is capable of establishing either one 2048 kbps link or two 
1152 kbps links.  
 
Figure 2.   AN/TSC-85 14 
[From The Army Satellite Communications Architecture Book] 
 
Ground Mobile Forces terminals are generally maintained by Integrated 
Signal Battalions (ITSBs) and deployed in support of Joint Task Forces, Corps, 
or Division headquarters.  These ITSBs are Signal units that are specially 
equipped with a wide variety of communications equipment.  When required to 
support Army operations with DSCS access they are attached to the supported 
headquarters for the mission’s duration.  Depending on the operation, they may 
                                            
13 25E Training Handbook, 6-16. 
14 Ibid., 6-14. 
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even be assigned as low as the Brigade Combat Team.  When these teams are 
deployed with TSC-85D or TSC-93D terminals, they typically deploy with a Signal 
Officer or Signal Non-Commissioned Officer who is responsible for the operation 
of the equipment.  The G/S-6 section of the unit will support the logistic needs of 
the GMF team and serve as their liaison with the unit.15 
2. Wideband Global System 
As the DSCS configuration nears the end of its service life, new systems 
are being developed to cover the requirement for global military satellite 
communications.  The Wideband Global System (WGS) enables significant 
improvement over the DSCS program.  WGS provides 2.1 to 3.5 Gbps of data 
throughput as compared to DSCS maximum throughput of 250 Mbps.  The 
incredible improvement is achieved with X- and Ka-band frequencies, frequency 
reuse and significantly increased power.   
Using Ka-band frequencies allows WGS to communicate with a much 
wider range of commercial terminals made by a wide variety of manufacturers.  
Ka-band terminals like the one shown in Figure 3 are generally assigned to units 
equipped with Joint Network Node (JNN) equipment.  Brigade Combat Teams 
and Division Headquarters are typically fielded JNN assemblages.  JNN was 
designed to connect users from the company level all the way to the Army level 
through existing government IP networks.  Each BCT would be fielded its very 
own JNN and each battalion within it would have its own Command Post Node 
CPN.  Some larger BCTs would have two JNNs. Division level headquarters 
would have something called a Hub Node, an 18-wheeler based giant version of 
the JNN. 16 
 
 
                                            
15 U.S. Signal Center, 2005. The Integrated Theater Signal Battalion: Way Ahead. (Briefing 
given March 2005 at Fort Gordon, GA.) 
16 Army Field Manual 6-02.60, 2006, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint 




Figure 3.   JNN Ka-Band Terminal17 
[From DataPath Integrated Solutions website] 
 
Standard X-band GMF terminals such as the AN/TSC-93D and AN/TSC-
85D also work with the WGS platform.  The WGS constellation is configured with 
X-band capabilities that provide the same level of service available on the DSCS 
satellites.  The first of six WGS satellites was launched on October 10, 2007, and 
put into service in April of 2008. 18   
3. Single Channel Tactical Satellite 
There is another genre of MILSATCOM available to Division and Brigade 
units.  Single channel Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) systems operate in the UHF 
frequency range and provide low throughput data and one-way voice.  The 
purpose of these TACSAT terminals is to provide a small, easily transportable 
communications device that can allow a soldier to talk from remote locations.   
Under general conditions, there are no FA40s assigned to locations remote 
enough to use these devices as a primary means of communications.  There 
                                            
17 DataPath Integrated Solutions, http://www.thedatapathuplink.com/issue1/ET3000.gif 
(accessed January 17, 2009). 
18 Ken Warren, 2007. WGA Launch ushers in new era of information dominance.45th Space 
Wing Public Affairs, October 10..http://www.patrick.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123072439 
(accessed January 17, 2009). 
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may, however, be access to UHF satellite radios in a Division or BCT Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC).  In such cases, a communications radio operator 
would operate the equipment and might seek out assistance from an FA40 for 
troubleshooting.  The main piece of UHF TACSAT equipment used in the Army 
currently is the AN/PRC-117, which is made by Harris Communications and 
shown in Figure 4.  The AN/PRC-117 operates in several VHF frequency ranges, 
but for satellite communications uses the UHF range between 225 and 512 MHz.  
The voice capability only operates in simplex or half-duplex mode and the data 
throughput is limited to a maximum of 115.2 kbps, but the unit is only slightly 
larger than a shoebox and fits easily into a backpack.  Therefore, with a very 
minimally sized package, voice and data capability can be obtained from virtually 
anywhere in the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite coverage area.  19 
 
Figure 4.   AN/PRC-117/G Satellite Radio20 
[From Harris Radio-Communications] 
 
4. FA40 Role in SATCOM 
The role of the FA40 assigned to a Division or Brigade in SATCOM 
operations can involve a wide variety of systems.  Whether GMF, Ka-band 
commercial communications, or single channel TACSAT systems, FA40 
contributions can be visible in several different capabilities that center on a 
specialized knowledge of space.  Playing a key role in the planning of SATCOM, 
FA40s provide knowledge of space related weather impacts on communications.  
                                            
19 Harris Radio-Communications, AN/PRC-117/G Specifications. 
http://www.rfcomm.harris.com/products/tactical-radio-communications/an-prc-117f-hq.pdf. 
(accessed January 17, 2009). 
20 Ibid. 
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Predicting possible outages at key times can be critical when orchestrating 
operations that require wideband access.  Frequency de-confliction and 
coverage predictions can also be very important in operations planning.  
Additionally, assisting Signal units in troubleshooting satellite problems can 
significantly contribute to the restoration of services.21  Troubleshooting 
assistance can come in two main ways: coordination with satellite control centers 
for status information and identifying satellite interference sources.  Tracking a 
satellite constellation’s operational status can be vital in identifying what 
limitations exist in any SATCOM system.  Understanding how to obtain and 
interpret those status reports can be invaluable for advising commanders before 
important decision points.  Not only can FA40s assist in identifying sources of 
interference for satellite links, they are also capable of determining High 
Frequency (HF) radio propagation capabilities.  Although HF radio use does not 
fall within the confines of SATCOM, its versatility in many Division and Brigade 
operations makes it a highly utilized resource.  Division and Brigade staffs have 
Signal personnel assigned to operate these communications systems, but often 
the FA40 can provide a subset of space-centric skills that enhance capabilities 
and provide a local resource for assistance. 22 
C. PRECISION NAVIGATION AND TIMING 
As soon as humans started traveling over long distances, they needed to 
know how to navigate.  Sailors learned how to navigate on the water with 
sextants by using stars as reference points.  In addition, land travelers learned to 
use a compass to take advantage of the Earth’s own magnetism to navigate.  
Navigation has always been important to the military just as it has for civilian 
travelers.  During the modern era of land warfare, the compass was the primary 
tool for commanders to coordinate movement.  Every soldier was taught basic 
                                            
21 U.S. Space and Missile Defense Command, 2007. FA40 Professional Reference Guide. 
(Space Operations Officer Qualification Course handout. Peterson AFB, CO): 52. 
22  Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 2004. Army Space Forces – Enabling the 
Joint Warfighter. Institution of Land Warfare Journal no. 100: 3. 
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land navigation skills to ensure they could use a map and compass in order to 
complete their mission.  The year 1993 marked the beginning of the end of the 
era of the compass and the sextant.  A road of navigation discovery that had 
started in 1974 with the first Global Positioning System (GPS) test satellite ended 
when the Air Force completed the 24-satellite constellation of the GPS on June 
26, 1993. 23  Since the completion of the GPS constellation, both the military and 
the civil sector have grown increasingly more reliant on it.   
Since the introduction of GPS into military operations, its impact has been 
significant enough to force the re-writing of tactics and doctrine.  Initially, GPS 
had three main objectives: surveying the Earth in order to make more accurate 
maps and tools, azimuth determination to help navigate on the ground, and 
inertial navigation for guidance systems. 24  As the system has matured and the 
many potential applications have become more evident GPS has worked its way 
into practically every aspect of tactical operations.  Weapons can be guided with 
such precision that they can destroy targets without harming nearby buildings.  
Soldiers and equipment locations can be identified within feet of their actual 
position on a near-real-time basis through the use of Blue Force Tracking.  GPS 
provides situational awareness on a global scale and gives tactical commanders 
a view of what is going on with their units at any given moment. 
Jamming is the altering or denial of a GPS signal due to either intentional 
or unintentional means.  There are multiple methods of jamming.  In its simplest 
form, transmitting power at a certain frequency or generating noise over a range 
of frequencies to prevent reception of GPS signals accomplishes GPS jamming.  
More elaborate methods such as spoofing work to give misleading and 
inaccurate readings.  Indications present when GPS jamming is ongoing can 
                                            
23 The National Academy of Sciences, The Global Positioning System: The Role of Atomic 
Clocks. http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.page.asp?I=1275  (accessed January 22, 
2009). 
24 Richard B. Marth Sr., 1992. GPS Army Research and Applications. U.S. Army 
Topographic Engineering Center. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA254262 (Information paper 
published at Fort Belvoir, VA. accessed on January 22, 2009): 5. 
 16
include an inability to acquire satellites on the receiver, the loss of acquired 
satellites, and inaccurate location data.25  The problem inherent in GPS jamming 
is the relatively low power broadcast by GPS satellites.  For comparison, a local 
FM radio station transmits approximately 100,000 Watts, a commercial cell 
phone tower approximately 800 Watts.  The GPS satellite transmits at only 20 
Watts.  Compounding the low power of the transmitted signal with the 20,200 km 
distance of the MEO orbit GPS satellites, the resultant interference propensity is 
easy to see.26  Major John Rayburn and Captain James Carson determined 
during their 2008 Master’s thesis on GPS interference detection that this low 
power level was at the root of the problem behind GPS device susceptibility to 
jamming.27  The element of uncertainty surrounding GPS enhanced tools is a 
significant concern for tactical commanders.    
1. Blue Force Tracker 
The key to a tactical commander’s unprecedented situational awareness 
is Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and the variety of add-on software packages that 
enhance it.  BFT takes positional data from GPS transmitted by friendly, or 
“blue,” forces and displays them on a Common Operating Picture (COP) 
interface in command centers around the world.  Other applications include the 
ability to send and receive messages and graphical overlays.  BFT is a key 
ingredient in an overall Army system called the Army Battle Command System 
(ABCS). 
a. Army Battle Command System 
ABCS includes a series of information exchange subsystems such 
as Advanced Field Artillery Targeting and Direction System (AFATADS) and All 
                                            
25 John C. Rayburn and James E. Carson, 2008. Design, Build, and Test a Hand-Held GPS 
Interference Detector. Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School: 11. 
26 Garmin Corporation, 2000. GPS Guide for Beginners (Garmin GPS user manual), Olathe, 
KS:5. 
27 Rayburn and Carson, 10. 
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Source Analysis System (ASAS).  Inside Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs) from 
the Company level and up, the BFT COP is displayed through situational 
awareness systems.  The most common Army system for TOC display is the 
Movement Control System (MCS) like the example shown in Figure 5.  In Joint or 
Coalition operations, the Command Control Personal Computer (C2PC) is 
frequently used.  Both C2PC and MCS provide command elements the ability to 
interact with and visually see BFT configured equipment in their area of 
operations.   
 
Figure 5.   Blue Force Tracker COP 28 
[From Army Battle Command System 6.4 Guide] 
 
b. Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below 
The individual Soldier interacts with the BFT system through the 
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2).  FBCB2 equipment, 
like those shown in Figure 6, and software are installed in individual HMMWVs, 
tanks, aircraft, and other vehicles.  FBCB2 serves as the tactical unit’s primary 
means of providing situational awareness to the overall commander as well as 
friendly units.  Not only can commanders see with GPS accuracy where their 
Soldiers are, they can communicate via prioritized message traffic.  The 
                                            
28 U.S. Army Central Training System Facility. 2006. Warfighter’s Guide to Army Battle 
Command System 6.4: 49 
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combination of different system add-ons, ground level input devices, and sharing 
of data contribute to an overall picture that is critical to orchestrate operations on 
a twenty-first century battlefield.   
 
Figure 6.   FBCB2 configuration in HMMWV29 
[From Army Chaplaincy] 
 
2.  FA40 Role in PNVT 
The FA40’s role in GPS employment is seen in GPS accuracy predictions 
and BFT coordination.  Ensuring operations are not impacted by GPS problems 
is accomplished predominately through access to the GPS Operations Center.  
The Operations Center, located at Shriever AFB, CO allows FA40s to contact the 
main control point for all GPS operations.  From there, space operations 
personnel can get accuracy estimates and answers to technical questions on 
                                            
29 Eric R. Keller, 2002. Digital Transformation of the Army and the Unit Ministry Team. The 
Army Chaplaincy. Summer-Fall. http://www.usachcs.army.mil/TACarchive/ACsumfal02/ 
Keller.htm (accessed on February 2, 2009). 
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GPS applications. 30  BFT equipped devices have a transmitter onboard that 
transmits up to a commercial L-band satellite and then down to the ABCS. 31  
ABCS maintains a connection with the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS) via a secret network and feeds position data back to BFT users.  The 
BFT-Mission Management Center (BFT-MMC) in Colorado Springs, CO 
manages the global BFT network.  BFT-MMC serves as a collection point for 
space-based systems and provides the connectivity between tactical forces and 
strategic assets.  The management center is operated by the SMDC and FA40s 
assigned to Divisions and Brigades contact them directly to troubleshoot 
problems with BFT. 32 
The ability to determine when jamming is occurring and finding methods to 
overcome it is a challenge for space operations officers and an area where the 
FA40 contributes to the tactical battlefield.  Through coordination with the Space 
Battle Management Core System (SBMCS), predictions on the accuracy of GPS 
systems can be determined. 33  Even though technology advances have enabled 
the  development of methods to defeat GPS jamming, the most effective means 
to counter jamming remains education.  Knowledgeable FA40s working on the 
Division or Brigade staff use their understanding of space assets to alleviate 
problems and inform units how to overcome jamming effects.  Often, GPS 
jamming problems go undiagnosed and result in nothing more than ill-performing 
GPS guided equipment.  Space operations officers who are capable of identifying 
potential jamming events provide opportunities to the tactical unit to save  
 
                                            
30 Space and Missile Defense Command, 2007. FA40 Professional Reference Guide: 7.  
31 Network Centric Warfare Case Study: Blue Force Tracker. 2006. 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/NCWCS%20Volume%201/13%20NCWCS%20V
olume%201%20(Appendix%20D).pdf. Carlisle Barracks, PA (Accessed on January 22, 2009). 
32 FM 3-14, 2005.Space Support to Army Operations, Space and Missile Defense 
Command: II-4. 
33 Lenard Gehrke, 2008. Global Positioning System. Space and Missile Defense Command 
(Briefing posted November 2008 and accessed from Army Knowledge Online on February 2, 
2009.). 
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equipment and conduct more effective operations.34  PNVT is an area where 
space impacts may not be as evident as others, but the return on investment can 
be substantial if properly understood. 
D. INTELLIGENCE 
Since as early as the Civil War, the military has used high altitude vantage 
points to gain a strategic advantage over adversaries.  In the Civil War the 
medium was balloons, in World War I, had biplanes were employed, and World 
War II, airplanes were used extensively to gather photo intelligence.  Since the 
resources to gather this kind of intelligence were always limited, the customers 
were generally only the very high-ranking headquarters.  As the intelligence 
gathering capabilities advanced from U-2 spy planes to Corona satellites, the 
customer remained strategic in nature. 35  Even as recently as DESERT STORM, 
the limited networks available to tactical commanders prevented them from being 
able to view imagery of any practical use.  Modern Divisions and Brigades now 
have the ability, through the use of high capacity communications networks, to 
use timely imagery.  The use of both national and commercial imagery systems 
make the planning of operations and assessment of effects available to levels 
that would not have been capable only five years earlier. 
Space Operations Officers serve as the main point of liaison between 
intelligence staff elements in the G/S-2 and the archives of combined imagery 
banks and current resources.  The way they accomplish this is through the use of 
critical points of contact within the imagery architecture and specialized 
equipment that enables access to products needed by tactical commanders.  Key 
systems used at these levels include the Space Support Element Toolset,  
Division Tactical Exploitation System and the Digital Topographic Support 
System. 
                                            
34 Bill Coffey, 2009 (comments noted during telephone conversation on January 2, 2009). 
35 Richard C. Olsen, 2007. Remote Sensing from Air and Space. Bellingham, WA: SPIE 
Press: 57. 
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1. Space Support Element Toolset 
The Space Support Element Toolset (SSET) was first used “during the 
Army Transformation Experiment, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 02 in July 2002”. 
36  The SSET is a system with many sub components that each addresses a 
different element of tactical imagery access.  
 Initially, the SSET was equipped with the Broadcast Request Imagery 
Technology Experiment (BRITE).  BRITE was a communications suite designed 
in a joint effort by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National 
Geospatial Agency (NGA).  During Army transformation experiments in 1998, the 
lack of bandwidth capacity in DESERT STORM era communications systems 
limited the use of imagery in tactical environments.  This shortfall was addressed 
through BRITE’s satellite communication capability and laptop computer loaded 
with imagery software.  The communications system for BRITE was outside of 
the DSCS network and used Ka-band commercial satellites. 37  As satellite 
communications evolved, the BRITE system became less frequently seen in the 
SSET. 
a. Space Operations System 
SSET’s are equipped with a Space Operations System (SOS) and 
Space Operations System Imagery (SOS-I) workstations.  The SOS computers 
are Windows-based computers equipped with software that allows the use of a 
range of different space products. 38  The most current version, version v2+, uses 
a 3.8 Ghz processor, 2 GB RAM, and 256 MB NVIDIA GeForce 6800 Go Ultra 
video card.39  Through the use of SOS’s many components the system is 
                                            
36 Debra Valine, 2004. “Battle Lab systems evolving to meet warfighters’ needs.”  Army 
Space Journal Fall 2004. SMDC: 36. 
37 Jane’s Information Group, 2001. BRITE lights the way for small-unit intelligence imagery. 
http://www.janes.com/extract/idr2001/idr00598.html (accessed January 23, 2009). 
38 Valine, 36. 
39 Tactical Space Operators Course, 2005. Space Support Enhancements Toolset. (Course 
presented December 2005 and accessed from Army Knowledge Online on January 23, 2009.) 
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capable of producing images and reports from national resources, analyzing 
reports on solar weather effects, GPS accuracy modeling, and providing missile 
defense launch and trajectory information as well as mapping support. 40 
The SOS system incorporates many common applications such as 
Microsoft Office and FrontPage, but space applications are what set SOS 
computers apart from typical workstations.  There are common space 
applications such as Satellite Tool Kit (STK), but there are others as well.  
Space/Missile Analysis Tool and Space Common Operating Picture Exploitation 
System (SMAT/SCOPES) allow SOS to model orbiting objects and missile 
trajectories. 41  The Space Battle Management Core System (SBMCS) is a 
software package that integrates with the GPS constellation and STRATCOM 
databases to allow operators to see current satellite information.  It uses regularly 
updated satellite ephemeris data to display where satellites are at given times.  
The SBMCS gives tactical commanders the ability to plan operations around 
enemy capabilities by knowing where and when friendly units are visible to 
enemy sensors. 42  The capability of the earlier generation BRITE system is also 
included through a BRITEVIEW software package (shown in Figure 7).  
Intelligence broadcasts on missile warning and situational awareness are 
available in near real-time through the Intelligence Situational Awareness Tool 
(ISAT).43  Additionally, the SOS computers are capable of obtaining COP 
information from GCCS through the use of the BFT supported programs 
Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) and Maneuver Control 
                                            
40 Future Warfare Center, Space Operations System: SOS. SMDC-FWC. 
http://www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SOS.pdf (accessed December 30, 2008). 
41 Air Force Modeling and Simulation Resource Repository, 2007. Air and Space 
Constructive Environment Integration. 
https://afmsrr.afams.af.mil/index.cfm?RID=SMN_AF_1000106 (accessed January 23, 2009). 
42 LeRoy Pedone, 1999. Integrated Space Command and Control.  USSPACECOM. 
http://sunset.usc.edu/gsaw/gsaw99/pdf-presentations/session-2/pedone.pdf  (accessed January 
23, 2009). 
43 Daryl Breitbach, 2008. Army Space Support Team – Tactical Set: Overview. SMDC. 
(Briefing presented for DCD training August 2008 an accessed via AKO January 23, 2009.) 
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System (MCS). 44  Imagery capabilities are also vital to SOS operations.  The 
SOS computer runs several different image related programs and is capable of 
accessing archives for most commercial imaging satellites.  Similar to many 
intelligence staff computers, SOS runs Falcon View for mapping and graphic 
overlays.  To handle large images, SOS uses ELT/3500 image-processing 
software developed by Overwatch Textron Systems. 45  An integral part of the 
SSET, the SOS computer packs a lot of capability in an easily transportable 
package used by many Division space staff officers. 
 
Figure 7.   BRITEVIEW vs. 2.0 screen capture46 
[From SMDC, Tactical Space Operators Course] 
 
b. SSET Communication Subsystems 
To solve the myriad communications problems common to remote 
tactical locations, the SSET employs International Maritime Satellite 
(INMARSAT) and the Space Applications Technology Research Network 
(SATURN).  A 128 kbps INMARSAT terminal provides encrypted data and voice 
                                            
44 Tactical Space Operators Course. 
45 Overwatch Textron Systems, ELT/3500 Product Overview. Overwatch Company website. 
http://www.elt.overwatch.com/3500_overview.php (accessed January 23, 2009). 
46 Tactical Space Operators Course. 
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capability for system troubleshooting or additional capability. 47  Composed of 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment, SATURN is a rapidly installable 
communications package designed to support the SSET for tactical locations.  
The system includes either a 1.2 or a 1.8 meter dish that can operate in the Ku 
and C bands, shown in Figure 8.  The dish size is dependent on where on the 
Earth the dish will be installed.  Communications throughputs of up to 9 Mbps 
downlink and 4 Mbps uplink are possible under the most ideal conditions, but 
around 2 Mbps is typical.  An Internet Protocol Satellite (IPSAT) NetModem 
provides the SATURN with a link into the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) Commercial SATCOM Branch (CSB).48  “The IPSET capability is the 
backbone of the SATURN’s broadband communications.”49      
 
Figure 8.   SATURN dish and black side transmission equipment50 
[From SMDC Briefing]  
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FA40s are the primary deployed users of the SSET.  They support 
the commander and intelligence staff through imagery and other intelligence 
products.  In addition, space status reports enable accurate planning for 
communications, GPS, and environmental impacts on operations.  The SSET 
program, including both SATURN and SOS systems, is managed through the 
SMDC Operations Center in Colorado Springs, CO and FA40s contact the help 
desk 24 hours a day for assistance. 
2. Division Tactical Exploitation System 
A second major system in use supporting Division Commanders is the 
AN/TSQ-219 Division Tactical Exploitation System (DTES), shown in Figure 9.  
The DTES is a powerful tool that provides deployed Division Headquarters “the 
ability to process, receive, exploit and use intelligence”.51  Army Corps are 
configured with an AN/TSQ-210 Tactical Exploitation System (TES) that has six 
High Mobility Multi Wheel Vehicles (HMMWV).  The DTES is a downsized 
version with reduced capabilities that is transported on two HMMWV shelters.   
The DTES provides a one-stop resource for most of the G-2’s intelligence 
requirements.  Specifically, the DTES can receive SIGINT signals both directly 
and from other systems, process imagery from national systems, receive the 
Global Broadcast Service (GBS), monitor BFT data, transmit data on UHF and S-
band frequencies, and integrate with Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 
System (JSTARS) Moving Target Indicators (MTI).  Only the TES has full 
connectivity with JSTARS, the DTES exploits MTI data only.  Additionally, the 
TES can process raw IMINT and SIGINT while the DTES cannot.52    
                                            
51 PEO IEW&S, Tactical Exploitation System. Army Space Program Office (accessed via 




Figure 9.   Division Tactical Exploitation System53 
[From PEO IEW&S] 
 
a. Tactical Exploitation System — Lightweight 
Brigade Combat Teams can also be equipped with a TES family 
capability.  The AN/TSQ-245 Tactical Exploitation System — Lightweight 
Intelligence Tactical Equipment (TES-LITE), shown in Figure 10, is a system 
transported in cases and designed for use in austere environments.  Typically, 
BCTs, special operations forces, or other smaller units needing access to 
national system intelligence use TES-LITE systems.  The TSQ-245 loses 
significant capability when compared to the DTES and even more compared to 
the TES.  When taken into the proper context of previous BCT capabilities, it 
provides a service when there was none prior.  TES-LITE cannot process 
SIGINT, access GBS, MTI data, or high bandwidth imagery products.  Otherwise, 
it can do essentially what the DTES is capable of doing. 
                                            
53 PEO IEW&S. 
 27
 
Figure 10.    TES-LITE system components54 
[From PEO IEW&S] 
 
b. TES Family Summary 
The TES family of space-based intelligence equipment is normally 
operated by Army Military Intelligence specialties.  However, the space-oriented 
nature of the equipment lends itself to FA40 involvement.  Organizationally, the 
DTES and TES-LITE are assigned to the G/S-2 staff elements.  DTES systems 
are currently fielded in six different Divisions:  the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort 
Bragg, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, 1st 
Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, and two with the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield 
Barracks. 55  
3. Digital Topographic Support System 
Terrain mapping and graphic products are extremely important to the 
Division and Brigade tactical commander’s decision-making process.  To ensure 
                                            
54 PEO IEW&S. 
55 Joseph Grebe, 2008. TES Family of Systems Support” Distributed Common Ground 
System – Army (Logistics Briefing June 2008 and accessed on AKO on  January 26, 2009). 
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they have the imagery they need, the Digital Topographic Support System 
(DTSS) is fielded at the Theater, Division, and Brigade levels.  Operated by 
Military Intelligence staff elements, DTSS comes in several types including the 
Base, Light, and Dismounted (DTSS-B, DTSS-L, and DTSS-D).  The DTSS-B is 
used at Theater levels of command, while the DTSS-L and DTSS-D are used at 
Division and Brigade levels depending on unit mission requirements.  The interior 
shelter space for the DTSS-L can be seen in Figure 11.  Like the BFT system, 
DTSS is connected to the ABCS overall command and control network through 
the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS).  The main purpose of the 
DTSS family of systems is to provide on the spot reproduction of map-sized 
imagery from National systems as well as tools that combine digital terrain 
analysis with overlays.  When equipped with the High Volume Map Production 
(HVMP) system, the DTSS can mass-produce up to 2,500, full color 22.5” x 29.5” 
imagery-based maps and products in a 24-hour period.56 
 
Figure 11.   DTSS-L Shelter Interior57 
[From Fort Sill BCTC] 
                                            
56 Army Battle Command System Overview, Fort Sill Battle Command Training Center 
(Slides prepared for BCTC training and accessed from AKO on February 5, 2009): slide 63. 
57 Army Battle Command System Overview. 
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4. Other Space-Related Intelligence Systems 
The synergistic relationship between Military Intelligence (MI) and Space 
requires frequent coordination and interaction.  The products that G/S-2 staff 
elements require for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) are often the 
result of FA40 and MI cooperation.  The equipment that provides space products 
is generally operated by MI Soldiers and can provide a combination of 
intelligence and additional communications resources.  The AN/TMQ-40 
Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) is an Air Force operated weather 
analysis tool.  IMETS gives tactical commanders, down to the brigade level, the 
operational impacts of meteorological conditions for all phases of the battlefield 
including communications and mission support.58  Finally, the AN/TSQ-190 
Trojan Spirit II (TSII) communications assemblage, operated by MI elements, 
provides Ku band SATCOM up to the SCI level for intelligence network access.  
Although these systems are not operated by FA40s, they are Space related and 
they do contribute to the tactical commander’s situational awareness. 
5. External Capabilities and FA40 Role 
The primary customer for imagery and other products provided from space 
systems is the G/S-2 intelligence staff element.  Regardless of the type of 
equipment used to obtain the imagery, FA40s are often considered the chief 
provider and subject matter expert for imagery at the tactical level.  Typically, the 
FA40 obtains products through portals accessed either through classified 
terminals or through some of the systems explained earlier.  Several 
organizations, external to the tactical unit, provide additional capabilities from 
space.   
                                            
58 Terry Slayter, New Material Introductory Briefing – IMETS. PEO C3T – Product Director 
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a. Spectral Operations Resource Center 
One of the key external resources for deployed FA40s is the 
Spectral Operations Resource Center (SORC).  The SORC is a source of 
support in a wide range of remote sensing applications.  It gives tactical units 
access to exploited spectral data from space and airborne sources.  The tactical 
FA40 may request anything from maps, to spectral analysis, to terrain analysis 
products through the SORC.  SORCs run operations on a twenty-four hour basis 
from Colorado Springs and can deploy small teams equipped with a vehicle-
mounted capability.  These deployable teams are assigned to the highest level of 
command involved in the task force and provide intelligence products where 
there is a combination of a justified need and a lack of organic capability.59 
b. Commercial Exploitation Team 
The new generation of commercial imaging satellites, with their 
improved resolution, has provided an additional resource for imagery intelligence.  
To take advantage of this extra capability, SMDC has developed the Commercial 
Exploitation Team (CET).  A CET is a deployable unit with a staff of seven people 
that is controlled by the 2nd Space Battalion in Colorado.  The two main assets 
the CET employs are the Spectral Exploitation Cell – Transportable (SPEC-TR) 
and the Eagle Vision ground station.   
c. Eagle Vision Ground Terminal 
The Eagle Vision terminal is a trailer mounted ground terminal, 
shown in Figure 12, developed by the Air Force that is capable of receiving a 
direct downlink from SPOT, Landsat, RADARSAT and OrbView commercial 
satellites.  Recent satellites, such as Space Imaging’s IKONOS and Digital 
Globe’s Quickbird, are accessible through an extra communications system, but 
not as direct downloads.  The complete 20-foot shelter assembly is capable of 
                                            
59 FM 3-14, B-14. 
 31
being transported in a single C-130 aircraft.  Additionally, the Eagle Vision can 
interface directly with other military imagery systems such as DTSS. 60 
 
Figure 12.   Eagle Vision deployable configuration61 
[Unknown photographer from Flickr photo website 
http://flickr.com/photos/45479866@N00/347837649] 
 
d. Spectral Exploitation Cell — Transportable 
SPEC-TR brings a capability to produce imagery products without 
other equipment.  The SPEC-TR team can deploy without Eagle Vision when 
only spectral image production is required, but is dependent on other 
communications assets in that configuration.  The two components combined, 
                                            
60 Rob Pietrafesa and Scott Matey, 2004. “Space experts provide warfighter access to 
commercial imagery.” SMDC. The Eagle Volume 11, No. 7: 21. 
61 Eagle Vision demonstration photo (taken during U.S. Air Force Memorial Dedication and 
Pentagon Open House October 2, 2006 (accessed from 
http://flickr.com/photos/45479866@N00/347837649 on February 5, 2009). 
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however, enable the CET team to provide imagery exploitation capabilities and 
direct access to commercial satellites in a tactical environment.62   
e. Commercial Imagery and Tactical Space 
In a time of increasing need for imagery products, skyrocketing 
costs of national systems, and improvements to commercially available 
resolution the CET provides a viable alternative source for near-real time 
intelligence.  Despite the additional resource, there are concerns with the use of 
commercial imagery for tactical use.  Specifically, when a commercial system 
such as IKONOS or Quickbird is keyed to provide access to a certain position 
within a certain timeframe it can be an indicator of U.S. intentions.  When added 
to other factors it allows a potential adversary to see an area the government is 
targeting.  There are mitigation efforts to minimize this effect, but it is a 
contributor to an overall picture of U.S. operations.  Commercial assets, however, 
provide a significant addition to other existing systems and can often assist when 
other resources cannot.  For example, a beneficial artifact of using commercial 
images can be seen in the ability to share with coalition partners.  Images 
downloaded from commercial sources can be shared more freely in a NIPRNET 
domain. 
6. Capabilities Summary 
The resources available to a modern tactical commander are astounding 
when compared to those of early commanders.  The same questions are being 
asked today that were asked 2000 years ago, but technology enables a much 
broader situational awareness.  The real dividing line between an ancient 
battlefield commander and a modern tactical commander is the span of their 
environment and the tools that provide control.   
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Army Division and Brigade Commanders have exceptional tools to 
measure and monitor situational awareness.  Key among the tools are Space-
based ones that showcase primarily imagery.  A palette of tools such as SSET, 
with its SATURN communications and SOS workstation, or the DTES, with its 
interoperability with other systems and reachback capability, are important to get 
an overall picture of what is available.  In addition, external resources such as the 
SORC and CETs available through SMDC and the 1st Space Brigade provide a 
high level of expertise all the way down to the battlefield command.  The power 
of this ability to deliver strategic quality products and knowledge to the tactical 
level enables capabilities that far exceed the typical.  Deployability of many of 
these resources extends the reach dramatically and provides the best Space-
based products possible in a timely enough manner to impact decision making at 
the tactical level.  Through these vital partnerships with SMDC, MI forces, the Air 
Force, and the commercial satellite industry, the FA40 is capable of providing 
many critical products that influence both operations and doctrine.  
 34
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III. ARMY TACTICAL SPACE MANNING 
A. ARMY SPACE HISTORY 
October 3, 1957, is generally considered the birth date of Army Space.  
On that date, the Redstone Anti-Missile Missile Systems Office opened in 
Huntsville, AL.  Coincidentally, the Russian Sputnik launch occurred one day 
later on October 4, 1957.  Although it became significant later, the concept of 
“tactical space” was not the focus of Army space efforts at the time.  The 
emphasis was primarily on missile defense and global communications. 63  As 
time marched on and satellite applications crept into many different areas of 
defense, the Army was forced to move beyond merely missile defense and 
communications.  The escalating importance of Space forced the Army to 
reconsider their role and, by 1984, began research into possible applications.  
Between 1986 and 1998, the Army honed many methods and products to deliver 
Space into tactical commanders’ hands.  It is during that time of experimentation 
that the Army Space Support Team (ARSST) was developed to provide that 
expertise.64 
As Army warfighting commanders gradually understood what space 
provides the battlefield, the necessity became more critical.  During the Cold War 
space access was primarily a strategic resource.  As technology embedded into 
frontline units Space capability evolved into a key aid for planning operations and 
situational awareness at the tactical level.  In order for the benefit to be more 
widespread, tactical units needed to be capable of accessing Space assets on a 
routine basis.  The Space-based products began to be available at lower levels 
of command and tactical commanders started to learn how they fit into the 
planning process, albeit with some reluctance.  This resistance to the use of  
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64 Lewis Berstein, 2005.”Army Space Support Teams: The Early Years 1986-1998.” Army 
Space Journal Winter Edition: 1F. 
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Space products was based on a lack of understanding of what they provide and 
how they work.  Space smart staff officers were not readily available in the early 
iterations of tactical Space. 
“In 1998, the Army recognized the need for a cadre of Space 
Professionals who were specifically trained in and knowledgeable of Space-
based capabilities and their employment in support of the Warfighter.”65   It was 
through this desire to provide space support to all appropriate levels of the Army 
that the Functional Area 40, Space Operations Officer concept was developed.  
SMDC is tasked with the responsibility of managing the FA40 career field due the 
extremely specialized nature of the occupation.  Initially, FA40s were primarily 
seen in Joint space locations with only 50 billets in U.S. Space Command, North 
American Defense Command, and the National Security Space Architect 
Office.66  As an extension of the FA40 development, the placement of FA40 
officers into tactical units as organic members became useful.  This step was 
attempted initially in 2001 with the 10th Mountain Division and demonstrated the 
origin of the Space Support Element (SSE). 67  The ARSST and SSE represent 
the two primary vehicles through which the Army provides FA40 expertise within 
today’s tactical staffs.  The role and design of each will be covered in more detail. 
B. ARMY SPACE SUPPORT TEAMS (ARSST) 
The establishment of the Army Space Institute in Fort Leavenworth, KS in 
1986 was a key moment in the evolution of the ARSST.  The Institute focused on 
Army Space doctrine, concepts, training and equipment with an ultimate purpose 
to educate the Army on the benefits of Space.  Through extensive 
experimentation and demonstration, the Institute exposed Soldiers to space 
capabilities.  Support of operations in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and 1991, Haiti in 
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66 Ibid., 11. 
67 SMDC, 2006. US Army Space Support Element (SSE) History 1998-2006. From Concept 
to Combat Capability  (SMDC briefing conducted 2006 and accessed from AKO December 19, 
2008). 
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1994 and 1995, and Bosnia from 1996 to 1998 exposed tactical commanders for 
the first time to what Space can provide.68  
The first Gulf War of 1990–1991, often referred to as the First 
Space War, demonstrated the benefits of Space capabilities on an 
actual battlefield to both Soldiers and commanders. In the deserts 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Army was exposed 
to the value of multi-spectral imagery, Global Positioning System 
position/navigation, satellite weather, ballistic missile warning and 
satellite communications.69 
That “First Space War” may highlight the incredible benefits of Space, but 
it also highlights a culture of misunderstanding.  Tactical commanders and staff 
had very little understanding of how the Space assets worked or even what they 
could provide.  In order to ensure effective use of Space, the Army developed the 
first space support team known as Contingency Operations-Space (COPS) in 
1994.  The intent of COPS was to deploy teams from Colorado Springs to 
support Army operations worldwide.  By the beginning of 1995, the COPS 
concept evolved into the ARSST and began supporting exercises.  ARSST 
teams supported 28 exercises in 1995 and began supporting worldwide 
operations in 1996 starting with the 1st Infantry Division in Tuzla, Bosnia.  The 
most common customers for ARSST services were the XVIII Airborne Corps out 
of Fort Bragg, NC and Army Special Operations.  The development of the FA40 
community was in large part connected with the newfound need to provide 
trained and knowledgeable personnel to operate ARSSTs.70 
The ARSST structure falls within SMDC as shown in Figure 13.  The 1st 
Space Brigade, headquartered in Peterson AFB, CO and its subordinate 1st 
Space Battalion are responsible for the training, equipping, and deployment of 
ARSSTs. 71  Within the 1st Space Battalion are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Space 
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Companies.  The 1st Space Company is responsible for theater missile warning 
through the six JTAGS stations located in Qatar, Germany, Korea, Colorado 
Springs, and Fort Bliss, TX.  The 2nd Space Company consists of six active duty 
ARSSTs and one Commercial Exploitation Team.  The 4th Space Company is a 
Space support unit.  The 3rd and 5th Space Companies are Army Reserve units 
consisting of ten ARSSTs and one CET.  In addition to the 1st Space Battalion, 
the Colorado National Guard’s 117th Space Support Battalion also consists of 
ARSSTs.  The 117th includes eleven ARSSTs and one CET.  There are 27 total 
ARSSTs and three CETs available Army-wide through the 1st Space Brigade and 
SMDC.72 
 
Figure 13.   SMDC Organizational Structure73 
[From Global Security] 
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73 1st Space Brigade, GlobalSecurity. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/agency/1space-
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The purpose of the ARSST is to provide Space-based capabilities to units 
with either no existing or insufficient organic capability of their own.  The ARSST 
mission statement states they “plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the 
execution of the five Space Force Enhancement Functions74: 
 Early warning 
 Satellite communications 
 PNVT 
 Weather, terrain & environmental monitoring 
 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
Specialized equipment combined with the space expertise of the ARSST 
personnel provide the power behind the ARSST capabilities.  Similar to the SSET 
explained in the capabilities section, the ARSST teams deploy with an Army 
Space Support Team Tool Set (ARSST-TS).  The ARSST-TS consists of two 
SOS terminals and a SATURN system.  The system can be deployed 
dismounted or mounted inside a HMMWV shelter and is tailored to the needs of 
the supported unit.  The ARSST personnel breakdown consists of six Soldiers 
with varied skills that are attached to the unit in the best method to support 
operations.75  A representative example is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.   ARSST Team Composition76 
[From FM 3-14] 
 
 
                                            
74 SMDC, ARSST Companies in the 1st Space Battalion (briefing given during 2004 AUSA 
seminar an accessed from AKO on February 3, 2009). 
75 FM 3-14, C-2. 
76 Ibid. 
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C. SPACE SUPPORT ELEMENT (SSE) 
Beginning in 2000, the Army underwent a period of dramatic 
transformation.  The result of the transformation was a radical change in the 
formation of Army units spurred on by the events of September 11, 2001.  The 
rigid Division and Brigade structures of the past were redesigned into a modular 
force.  The goal of the new “modularity” was to build a stable of equally versatile 
brigade sized units called Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are each capable 
of being used to accomplish a wide range of missions.  BCTs were designed to 
report to a Division or Corps level headquarters called a Unit of Employment 
(UE).  The structure of the BCT retained a connection to the Division they are 
historically part of, but could be called upon to operate autonomously or in a 
team of BCTs working in unison under a UE.   
As the ARSST teams continued to deploy in support of Divisions, the push 
towards modularity begged the question of whether BCTs and UE headquarters 
needed space support too.  During an exercise called Millennium Challenge 
(MC00)/ Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF AWE), 
the FA40 community experimented with the placement of FA40 Space 
Operations Officers within Division headquarters.  Captain Bill McClagan served 
as the 10th Mountain Division’s first organic Space Operations Officer.  Captain 
McClagan was assigned to the Division G3 staff for the exercise located in Fort 
Polk, LA. 77  The outcome of the experiment was a desire by the Division staff to 
retain space expertise as a permanent resource.  During the Interim Division 
Redesign Conference in October 2001, the Army coined the term Space Support 
Element (SSE) to symbolize the organic space team.  The purpose of the SSE 
was to provide the same expertise provided by the ARSST, but on a full-time 
basis. 78 
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Figure 15.   First SSET used for MC0279 
[From SSE History] 
 
By August 2002, the first experimental SSE was ready to test the first 
SSET in a tactical setting, shown in Figure 15 above.  The 82nd Airborne Division 
from Fort Bragg, NC conducted Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02)/ Army 
Transformation Experiment 2002 (ATEx02) to see what an SSE with space tools 
could provide a Division headquarters.  Major Dave Hotop led the first SSE 
through MC02/ATEx02.  The results of the first SSE experiment were considered 
successful and the Army deemed the SSE a valid part of the Modified Table of 
Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for Division sized units in 2003.  By 2004, 
the first completely organic SSE was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort 
Stewart, GA.  80  Tables 1 through 5 depict the basic structure for various SSEs. 
 
 
                                            





Title MOS Rank 
Space Support Element Chief 40A O5 
Space Operations Officer 40A O4 
Space Operations Officer 40A O4 
Satellite Communications Systems Operator 25S E6 
Satellite Communications Systems Operator 25S E6 
Table 1.   Corps SSE Team Composition 
 
Division SSE 
Title MOS Rank 
Space Support Element Chief 40A O5 
Space Operations Officer 40A O4 
Satellite Communications Systems Operator 25S E6 
Satellite Communications Systems Operator 25S E6 
Table 2.   Division SSE Team Composition 
 
BCT SSE 
Title MOS Rank 
Space Operations Officer 40A O4 
Table 3.   BCT SSE 
 
There are ten SSE teams currently assigned to ten active duty Division 
headquarters.  Additionally, eight National Guard divisions are equipped with 
SSEs.  A complete roster of SSEs available across the Army includes three at 
Corps level and seven at the Army level.  As the development of the SSE 
evolves, the structure of the teams evolves also.  Currently, the only Division 
SSE containing enlisted members is the 1st Infantry Division, with all others 
having either two or four FA40 officers assigned.81  The layout of personnel 
within both active duty and National Guard Divisions can be seen in Tables 4  
and 5. 
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Active Duty Divisions Authorized SSEs 
Total 
Personnel Notes 
1st Armored Division 2 only officers 
1st Cavalry Division 2 only officers 
1st Infantry Division 4   
2nd Infantry Division 2 only officers 
3rd Infantry Division 2 only officers 
4th Infantry Division 4 only officers 
10th Mountain Division 2 only officers 
25th Infantry Division 2 only officers 
82nd Airborne Division 2 only officers 
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 2 only officers 
Table 4.   Active Duty Division SSEs82 
 
 
National Guard Divisions Authorized SSEs 
Total 
Personnel 
28th Infantry Division 2 
29th Infantry Division 2 
34th Infantry Division 4 
35th Infantry Division 2 
36th Infantry Division 2 
38th Infantry Division 4 
40th Mountain Division 2 
42nd Infantry Division 2 
Table 5.   National Guard SSEs83 
 
The mission of the SSE is to serve as the assigned unit’s chief proponent 
of Space.  They provide a point of liaison between the Division and reachback 
capabilities for Space-borne resources ranging from the National Geospatial 
Agency (NGA), to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), to the SMDC 
support infrastructure.  FA40s assigned as SSEs develop Operations Order  




Space Annexes, contribute to planning, and provide input into Space Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield, PNVT, BFT, and satellite communications systems 
employment. 84 
Space Operations Officers assigned as BCT SSEs serve the same 
purpose as the Division counterpart, but on a smaller scale.  The long-term plan 
for BCT SSEs is to field one FA40 for every one of the 15 Future Combat System 
(FCS) capable BCTs.  As of 2009, only five BCTs include FA40 officers.  In the 
next section, the utility of the BCT FA40 will be explored in detail.85 
D. SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL 
The development of ARSST, SSE teams and the FA40 all demonstrate 
the Army’s desire to provide space capabilities to tactical commanders.  The 
evolution of the FA40 from a small group of specialized officers to a formal 
functional area complete with organizational training courses and equipment sets 
is analogous to the formation of either incarnation of space skilled teams (SSE or 
ARSST).  The ARSST and SSE began with groups of officers from mixed 
backgrounds who brought non-doctrinal skills to accomplish missions that did not 
fall under the responsibility of any one branch.  As the complexity of space 
products and the desire for them progressed, the non-doctrinal approach began 
to be less advantageous.  Similarly, the FA40 community began with a pool of 
officers that had obtained space-skills outside of their doctrinal duties, but those 
skills were not standardized and varied greatly from individual to individual.  The 
ARSST and SSE teams addressed the shortfall from an operational perspective, 
but to satisfy the new, space-based mission areas from a staff position 
perspective the FA40 career field was developed.  The genealogy of the FA40’s  
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85 Bill Coffey, 2009 (phone conversation with SMDC FWC Training Proponent Bill Coffey on 
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existence as a functional area can be traced through both the ARSST and SSE, 
for without the first ARSST the impetus for an SSE would not exist and further 
the necessity for the FA40. 
FA40 officers serve as commanders of both team variants.  The main 
difference between an ARSST and a SSE is that the former works for the 1st 
Space Brigade and is loaned to tactical units while the latter is a permanent part 
of the tactical unit.  There are inherent benefits and limitations for both teams.  
Clearly, there are applications for either, demonstrated by the fact that the 
numbers of ARSSTs has grown from initially only a couple to almost 30 currently, 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY 
A. OVERVIEW 
1. Modularity and Impact on Space Forces 
Space Operations Officers remain a relatively recent development in the 
Army force structure.  Having only existed formally since 1998, there is still much 
to discover in finding the proper methods to apply their skills.  In the wake of 
transformational change within the Army, the application of Space as a resource 
is often overlooked.  The Army seeks to achieve modularity but many Army 
leaders and planners do not fully understand the contributions of Space to the 
warfighter.  The instinct by many leaders is to apply a “pure-modularity” 
technique.  This means that each Division or BCT has a slice of every applicable 
specialty within the unit whether the unit has a legitimate need or not.  The 
danger in such an approach is that many specialties lose touch with technology 
and tactics associated with their field.  When the organic unit does not 
understand what the Soldier provides and the Soldier cannot promote their 
contribution effectively, they are often utilized in other areas needed by the unit.  
This can result in a reduction of perishable skills, which not only reduces the 
capabilities of the organic unit, but the Army as a whole.  The application of 
FA40s throughout the Army falls under this category.  One method to prevent 
misapplication of FA40s is to involve members of the space professional cadre in 
the decision making process where possible.  LTC Clay Scherer states in his 
2005 Master’s thesis Army Space and Transformation that if Space is to “play a 
key role in the Transformed Army” Space educated individuals “must be 
embedded in the force structure development process.” 86   
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Master’s Thesis, 36. 
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2. Analysis Method 
Creating a more efficient FA40 distribution involves FA40 inclusion in the 
development process, determining the current configuration, analyzing 
effectiveness of the current configuration, and designing a better method.  The 
first step is crucial.  Justifying to the upper leadership the criticality of Space-
capabilities is important to ensure issues are heard at high enough levels.  
Second, an accurate picture of how FA40s are distributed throughout the 
organization is necessary to give a baseline measurement.  Using planning and 
assessment tools, determining the usefulness of the current configuration is 
possible.  Finally, analyzing available alternatives and recommending a more 
logical way can help chart a course to a more effective force.  The next sections 
will summarize these factors individually. 
3. Justifying Space to the Army 
In order to ensure the FA40 functional area continues to grow and develop 
some salesmanship is needed on both the organizational and the unit levels.  
LTC Scherer’s insights into the connection between Army capability gaps and 
Space capabilities are an excellent place to start.  The Army used these 
capability gaps to determine transformational impacts on the Future Force, so 
using them to demonstrate where Space can help overcome existing gaps is 
appropriate.  On a unit level, the individual FA40 must ensure they understand 
where Space can contribute to the unit.  Potentially, these contributions may not 
be immediately discernable and are heavily reliant on the abilities of the FA40. 87 
4 FA40 Current Utilization 
FA40s are assigned at several levels of Army command.  Just as a 
preliminary examination, approximately 54% of active FA40s are assigned to 
Joint, Strategic, or Army level units.  Of the remaining 46%, 17% work within the 
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1st Space Brigade and 24% work at Corps or below Space Support Element jobs.  
The remaining 5% work at various branch immaterial positions unrelated to 
space. 88  This is a cursory look at distributions; in a later section, they will be 
examined in much more detail. 
5. Effectiveness Study 
An ideal way to examine the issue of FA40 utilization is to study 
applications and resources in terms of DOTMLPF.  DOTMLPF is a military 
planning assessment tool that stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Material, Leadership, Education, Personnel, and Facilities.  The purpose behind 
DOTMLPF is to provide a template to be used when studying a new program or 
system.  The DOTMLPF ensures that all of the major sections are included in 
any study.  In terms of FA40 utilization throughout the Army, DOTMLPF provides 
a sound baseline to begin a study. 
6. Better Methods 
To provide the Army with the most effective cadre of Space Operations 
Officers, some modifications must be made to the current system.  One of the 
most integral factors in redesigning the space force is the training of the rest of 
the Army.  Rather than spreading FA40s throughout Divisions and BCTs where 
they have limited contact with Space elements, the concept of leaving them 
within the 1st Space Brigade provides consistent Space education and cross 
fertilization of Space knowledge.  Space applications at definitely the BCT level, 
and likely the Division level, are generally little more than using web-based 
applications and software packages.  Those skills are mainly only applied during 
deployments.  Training resident G/S-2 staff or G/S-6 staff members how to 
accomplish these tasks on their own ensures they are available for necessary 
missions.  
                                            
88 SMDC, FA40 Roster version 2.51 (spreadsheet obtained from Bill Coffey via email dated 
December 4, 2008). 
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B. SPACE ROLE IN ARMY TRANSFORMATION 
1. Army Campaign Plan 
As explained earlier, transformation of the Army’s organizational and 
operational structure is a significant evolutionary step for the Army.  The Army 
Campaign Plan (ACP) is the Army’s plan to achieve this transformation.  In 2004, 
the National Military Strategy describes a desire for the DOD to become more 
combined, adjustable, and decentralized while at the same time increasing 
battlefield capabilities.  The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 expresses a 
fresh view of Soldier skills with an extremely flexible fighting force that is capable 
of moving from one kind of mission to another without losing special skills.89  The 
plan outlines a modular force with maximum capabilities combined into smaller, 
more mobile packages that can interact with other packages in a Joint 
environment.   
This directive is the FA40’s main point of interaction with the overall Army 
planning structure.  Although SMDC is also instructed to complete tasks relating 
to missile defense and high altitude operations there are specified space-related 
objectives as well.  In terms of space, the plan directs SMDC to: 
Continue efforts to ensure Space Superiority. 
Assist the G-3/5/7 and Training Doctrine Command in the development 
and refinement of Space related Force Design Updates. 
Continue to develop Space professionals and assist G-3/5/7 in the 
identification of Space Cadre positions and enablers. 
Develop and transition advanced technology to provide material solutions 
to the current and Future Force.90 
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Unclassified excerpt only (June 16, 2008): (accessed from Army Knowledge Online on February 
14, 2009): 3. 
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The ACP serves as the driver behind the transformation towards a 
modular and effective fighting force.  Modularity, in terms of the ACP, means to 
build Brigade sized elements with multiple applications that can have an impact 
in any scenario.  An estimate for final conversion of all Army Brigades to modular 
BCTs is 2013.91  As the Army continues towards this end state, it is vital that the 
FA40/Space proponent, SMDC, is involved in the development process.  
Involvement ensures that the requirements to sustain the capable Space Force 
do not become lost in the overall push to transformation.  Attempting to make 
every specialty fit into modular blocks may have long-term implications in the 
health and effectiveness of low-density skills such as Space.   
The plan instructs SMDC to not only ensure space superiority for the 
Army’s space applications; it also directs several system acquisition based 
elements.  Force design and material solutions imply a connection to acquiring 
new space-based systems.  Although there are no FA40s at the Division or 
Brigade level making decisions in regards to new space systems, there are many 
positions within SMDC that do.  One current gap, and therefore potential area for 
improvement in FA40 utilization, is the lack of a permanent acquisition specialty.  
The same FA40 personnel who are assigned to a Division SSE for one rotation 
may be in an acquisition related position for a subsequent tour.  This has little 
impact on Division and Brigade elements, but does play a role in the overall 
utilization of FA40s.  The result of having no permanent acquisition specialty is 
that there are no experts over the long term in regards to Army space 
applications.  Despite many programs of record that provide space capabilities to 
the Army, there are no full time, space educated personnel managing them.  
There are Army Acquisition Corps officers working space issues with specialized 
training such as the 3-Yankee skill identifier, but there are no full time FA40 
acquisition personnel.  I propose a more effective means of managing the Army’s 
space programs through the use of an FA40 Space Operations Officer as a 
trained acquisition professional.  FA40s in acquisition heavy jobs are already 
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doing the work, but they may not have the time to develop competence before 
being assigned for other duties.  A permanent cadre of space acquisition 
professionals ensures excellent oversight on all of the Army’s many space-based 
programs. 
2. Units of Transformation 
In the 2000 version of the Army Space Master Plan, it was advocated to 
have organic Space staff within Corps and Divisions.  Prior to this, Space support 
for these units was exclusively ARSST teams deployed when support was 
requested.  That plan seeks an end state for space as being a normal and 
organic element within the tactical unit. 92  Initially, Division level staffs are as low 
as organic FA40 support is recommended to be fielded, but demand to add BCTs 
to the list has escalated.    
The BCT is the building block of Army modularity.  Based on the 2009 end 
strength of 235 active FA40s, fielding an SSE in every one of the 48 active BCTs 
is unrealistic and untenable.  Instead, the decision is made to support some 
FA40s in Fires BCTs.  The Fires BCT experiment has been met with limited 
success and will be covered in greater detail in the assessment section.  The 
long-term goal is to place an FA40 on the staff for every Future Combat System 
(FCS) equipped BCT with the Fires BCT serving as a stepping stone.93  The FCS 
BCT is a modernization program that showcases many high-technology 
capabilities such as fully networked vehicles, the Joint Tactical Radio System 
(JTRS), advanced sensors, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as well as 
unmanned ground vehicle capabilities.94  The FCS BCT is currently under 
program development and designed to provide advanced capabilities to tactical 
                                            
92 Department of the Army, United States Army Space Master Plan, SMDC (Washington, 
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units.  An Enhanced-BCT (E-BCT) is currently testing unproven and unrefined 
technologies with procurement scheduled to begin in 2010, followed by fielding 
and delivery of equipment in 2011. 95  
Currently, both ARSST teams and SSEs fulfill Army Space tactical 
requirements.  ARSST teams are requested by units based on an “as needed“ 
basis and typically are assigned to Theater, Joint, or other less standardized 
organizations.  Since the introduction of SSEs into Divisions, there has been less 
ARSST support for Division levels.  It is not, however, impossible for a Division 
with an SSE to request ARSST support if the mission warrants it.  Space support 
for tactical units is a vital part of the Space Force’s contribution to the overall 
Army mission. 
3. Comparing Capability Gaps to Space Capabilities 
In his Master’s thesis, LTC Scherer points out several areas where Space 
capabilities can address existing Army shortfalls.  The identification of these 
areas of impact is important to the overall relevance of space in the Army’s 
transformation into the Future Force.  The side-by-side comparison of these 
capability gaps with the Army space capabilities that address them can be seen 
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Army Capability Gap Space Capability 
Soldier Protection Missile Warning, Space Control 
Effective Command and Control SATCOM, PNVT 
Platform Protection Missile Warning, Space Control 
Uninterrupted C4 Architecture SATCOM, PNVT 
Modular, Tailorable Forces Army Space Cadre 
Capability for Lethal Overmatch SATCOM, PNVT 
Enable the Army to Train as it 
Fights SATCOM, PNVT 
Provide ISR Capabilities ISR platforms, Weather Monitoring 
Provide Capability to Detect and 
Identify Obstacles ISR platforms, Weather Monitoring 
Provide Logistics to Sustain 
Modular Force SATCOM, PNVT 
Table 6.   Space Capabilities Compared to Gaps96  
 
The use of ARSST and SSE forces demonstrates the customer side of 
space support.  The tools, training, and equipment provided through SMDC 
demonstrate the larger, organizational view of space support.  The combination 
of the two is how the Space Force accomplishes these tasks.  SMDC builds 
priorities from the capability gaps in order to ensure mission accomplishment.  
The ability to link capability gaps with space capabilities and then with space 
priorities is critical in establishing space as a legitimate partner for developing 
future plans.97   
There is little dispute that space products are valued by tactical 
commanders, but the methods through which they are provided is more 
ambiguous to those same commanders.  Very few have a comprehensive 
understanding of space assets and how they work.  The complexity of space 
problems has typically been the justification for the presence of space staff 
officers on tactical staffs.  The commander understood they needed the products, 
but did not want to invest time into how they were obtained.  Looking at this 
problem from an organizational view, space products could theoretically be 
                                            
96 Scherer, 41-42. 
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provided by any staff officers with a rudimentary knowledge of the required 
systems.  The commander is generally more interested in final products than 
processes.  Frequently commanders have retained space staff more out of fear 
of losing personnel than in actually requiring the space expertise.  This issue is at 
the heart of FA40 utilization in Division and Brigade elements.  From the Army 
organizational level determining the structure of future Armies to the local tactical 
commander determining how best to utilize his staff, understanding how space 
impacts operations is the first key step in carving out the future of the space 
force.  Some important questions to ask as development continues to evolve are: 
 —  What is the real contribution of space at the tactical level?  
 —  Do FA40s provide exclusive services or do they merely augment other 
staff sections? 
Educating upper echelon command, planners, and doctrine developers is 
very important to set the stage for future space forces.  Instructing leaders in 
orbital mechanics and complex satellite operations is not necessary.  More 
important is a cursory understanding of how the unit on the battlefield can best 
accomplish its mission over the long-term using space assets.  Often, the answer 
has been to solve the problem by putting space educated professionals at lower 
and lower levels of command.  Perhaps educating staff to obtain space products 
on their own and educating leaders on realistic expectations is an alternative 
solution.  Space professionals are needed in tactical environments to provide 
specialized services, but education for staff and commanders would enable a 
broader reach for space enabling technology.  Broader reach ensures more 




C. FA40 DISTRIBUTION 
As of December 2008, there are 235 FA40s currently assigned within the 
Army.   An overwhelming 76% of all FA40s are assigned outside of the SSE 
structure.  The remaining 24% - 13 Lieutenant Colonels, 30 Majors, and 15 
Captains - work within an SSE at some level.  Table 7 displays the number of 
FA40 Lieutenant Colonels, Majors, and Captains both authorized and available 
across the Army. 
 Authorized Available Percentage 
LTC 63 59 94% 
MAJ 93 115 124% 
CPT 24 38 158% 
Total 180 212 118% 
    
Table 7.   FA40 Authorizations98 
 
Although the apparent percentage of available FA40s appears to be highly 
over strength, the chart does not reflect the numbers of FA40s that are not 
serving within the FA40 functional area.  Reasons why an FA40 may not serve 
within the functional area include attending advanced graduate education, 
working with industry, or having been accepted into the FA40 branch and 
awaiting release from the former branch.  A more accurate depiction of the FA40 
strength can be seen in Table 8. 
 




LTC 63 57 2 90% 
MAJ 93 94 21 101% 
CPT 24 16 22 67% 
Total 180 212 45 93% 
Table 8.   Functional Area Percentage99 
                                            
98 Alan Hughes, 2009. FA40A Strength (spreadsheet provided by FA40 Proponent Office). 
99 Ibid. 
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Taking into account the actual FA40s serving within the space cadre, the 
numbers still appear to be healthy overall.  A small deficit exists for Lieutenant 
Colonels, but a much larger one exists for the Captain level FA40.  A main 
reason for this discrepancy is the accession process of new FA40s.  When an 
officer is converted into an FA40 they may continue to work in their former field 
for several years.  Once accessed into FA40 they still must complete any tour or 
payback requirements for their old branch before being released.  Also not 
mentioned in the chart is the status of Colonel FA40s.  The Army maintains 13 
Colonel positions for FA40s, but has an inventory of 19 as of February 2009.100 
There are two alternate groups that work in the space and satellite field 
other than FA40s.  The 3-Yankee (3Y) identifier and several enlisted specialties 
add to the Army’s overall space picture.  Both contribute in different ways, but act 
to provide depth for the space cadre. 
Developed in 1985 to satisfy the need for space-educated individuals to 
accomplish space related missions, the 3Y identifier is an extra skill that many in 
the Army are capable of earning.  The concept of the 3Y serves to provide 
formally trained and certified space professionals that are not FA40s to augment 
the Army Space Cadre.  As discussed earlier, an example of 3Y utilization is 
found in the Acquisition Corps personnel who oversee space programs.  To 
obtain the 3Y identifier, individuals must complete a 108-hour space course, work 
in a space related field for a minimum of one year, or possess a degree in space 
that is validated by the 3Y approval authority. 101  
The numbers of 3Y positions within the Army has shifted over time.  As 
the FA40 career field developed, the number of 3Y trained personnel dropped 
from a high of 700 in 2000 to 503 in 2009.  Since the 3Y was designed to fill 
space related positions, it is only natural that FA40 growth has a reciprocal 
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relationship with 3Y manning.  Despite the fact that there are 513 available 3Y 
personnel within the Army in 2009, there are only 171 authorized positions.  A 
modest increase to 176 positions is planned in 2010. 102  The future role of the 
3Y seems uncertain as the numbers of FA40s continues to climb. 
Enlisted personnel working to support the Army Space Cadre are 
generally considered to be “Space Enablers”.  They augment the FA40 force and 
help accomplish the overall space mission from several branches within the 
Army.  The Signal Corps field 31-Sierra (31S) is a satellite communications 
specialist that can be assigned to Signal communications units as well as space 
support staff.  Air Defense Artillery (ADA) is the branch of the Army that 
historically has managed missile defense and the 14-Juliet (14J) enlisted 
specialty manages Air Defense Tactical Operations Centers.  These Soldiers 
typically can be found serving within JTAGS Theater Missile Warning 
detachments.  Additionally, several subspecialties within the Military Intelligence 
(MI) branch have applications in the space field due to knowledge of collection 
platforms and familiarity with products.  Based on 2006 figures, the total number 
of enlisted space enablers is around 625 active duty forces, 138 Reserve 
component, and 388 National Guard.  There are plans to grow this force by 
approximately 75% by 2011. 103 
D. DOTMLPF ASSESSMENT 
1. Doctrine 
Significant effort is being expended by both the Joint world and the Army 
to craft doctrine for space applications.  In January 2009 the Joint Publication 3-
14 (JP 3-14) update was released after a seven-year gap.  Many ideologies and 
standard operating procedures had changed since 2002 and the new publication 
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reflected much of it.  Of specific note, the new JP 3-14 revises many space 
concepts including the streamlining of space efforts under U.S. Strategic 
Command and the removal of the U.S. Space Command.104  Derived from JP3-
14, Space Support to Army Operations or FM 3-14 was published in March 2005 
and illustrates how the Army uses space assets to accomplish its land 
component mission.  FM 3-14 serves as the Army’s primary resource for 
guidance on space operations.  In addition to high-level overviews on SMDC’s 
role and essential space history, FM 3-14 discusses how Space Operations 
Officers interact with other Army staff elements through the space estimate and 
the space decision support template (SDST).  The purpose of the space estimate 
is to recommend the most effective use of space assets to accomplish a given 
mission or exercise.  For Division and Brigade SSEs, the space estimate 
demonstrates a vital means of communicating space capabilities through the 
G/S-3 Operations Order process to the commander.  The SDST shows how 
space supports ongoing operations and assists in demonstrating how best to use 
those assets for further operations. 105  These tools are key in communicating 
with the command structure the value of space. 
2. Organization 
The organizational structure of SMDC and its many contributions to the 
Army are covered in great depth by LTC Scherer’s work in his 2005 Master’s 
thesis.  Although some in the Army feel that Missile Defense and Space duties 
could be better served as two separate entities, LTC Scherer noted that they had 
many complementary technologies and should remain consolidated under the 
three-star command of SMDC.  Splitting them up could potentially mean less flag 
level emphasis for each.  106 
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As the Army’s prime proponent for missile defense, space, and high 
altitude operations SMDC operates in a varying environment.  SMDC not only 
coordinates missile-warning activities it serves as the Army’s strategic 
component lead under USSTRATCOM.  As the main space proponent, SMDC is 
responsible for an array of research, development and acquisition facilities as 
well as testing ranges and a battle lab.  Additionally, the 1st Space Brigade 
supports Army operations worldwide with space support in the form of ARSSTs, 
CETs, SORC, and other reach back capabilities.  The scope of Army Space that 
SMDC manages is diverse and far-reaching.   
Within the Division structure, the SSE is doctrinally assigned to the G3 
current operations section.  Similarly, BCT SSE FA40s are assigned to the S3.  
In practice, the organizational location of FA40s can vary slightly more.  A survey 
of current FA40s showed that most do work within the G/S-3 structure, but based 
on individual unit needs and officer strengths some work elsewhere.  Anecdotal 
reports list FA40s employed in jobs ranging from public affairs offices and special 
project officers, to hurricane warning cells.  More reasonably many work as battle 
captains in Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) or in G/S-2 sections.  Generally, 
the lack of consistent space-related work for FA40s has led to many units finding 
alternate duty functions for them.  The two most prevalent are the Special 
Technical Operations (STO) and Alternate Compensatory Control Measures 
(ACCM).  Although neither of these is space-related, the clearance requirements 
prevalent in both make FA40s a logical choice to fill the need.  Most likely, if no 
FA40 were present, someone from the G/S-2 section would accomplish the 
mission.   
A study conducted in mid-2008 by SMDC examines what percentage of 
SSE personnel time is actually spent on space-related activities while deployed.  
Forty-two FA40s deployed over the span of six years were included in the study.  
The study discovered an overall percentage of 45% of SSE time is spent on 
space and 55% spent on other duties.  Taken at face value, this seems in sync 
with typical Army officer duties from other functional areas.  However, as 
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demonstrated in Table 9, a closer look at the dates the SSEs were surveyed 
shows a clear trend away from space utilization.107 
 
 Time spent on space Time on non-space 
Years 2002-2003  95% 5% 
Years 2004-2006 42% 58% 
years 2006-2008 31% 69% 
Table 9.   FA40 Utilization Breakdown108 
 
The trend away from space in the SSE is the product of several factors.  
At the outset of OIF/OEF there was very little imagery and units were deploying 
to areas for the first time.  This results in an elevated requirement for space 
products and a clear application for FA40s.  As the war continues, less of these 
products are needed and fewer space applications are necessary to accomplish 
the mission on a tactical level.  In the modern Divisional structure traditional 
sections cover many of the space provided resources.  The G2 maintains 
equipment and sections that specialize in IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT.  
Similarly, the G6 is tasked with monitoring the satellite communications 
infrastructure as well as frequency management.  Additionally, the Division 
Weather Officer monitors space weather effects.  The space expertise brought by 
the FA40 to the Division staff is largely already within the Division staff in other 
sections.  The apparent double-coverage of space products is a potential area 
where FA40 utilization could be altered for better efficiency.  
 
3. Training and Education 
The training model used within SMDC produces qualified members of the 
Army Space Cadre.  Once accessed into the FA40 career field, officers attend 
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the Space Operations Officer Qualification Course (SOOQC) in Colorado 
Springs, CO.  The SOOQC is conducted twice a year with approximately thirty 
students per course and teaches basic orbital mechanics along with an 
introduction to national systems.  In 2005, SMDC developed and began to 
conduct the Tactical Space Operations Course (TSOC) in order to prepare 
officers scheduled to work in SSEs.  The TSOC focuses on skills necessary for 
tactical space applications and includes practical exercises on many topics.  A 
small subset of the topics includes GPS electromagnetic interference, BFT 
integration, commercial satellite imagery, satellite communications systems, 
overhead persistent infrared systems, and environmental effects on 
communications.109     
The FA40 community utilizes several different methods to educate 
members of the space cadre.  Many FA40 personnel are selected to attend 
Advanced Civil Schooling to obtain graduate degrees in space systems or to 
work in the space industry for a period of time.  There is also a selection of 
distance learning opportunities available through SMDC in the form of seven 
online courses.  Augmenting formal instruction, SMDC coordinates continuing 
education in the form of annual conferences, symposia, and a quarterly journal.  
Training is a point of emphasis within the Army space community and an area of 
note. 
4. Material 
Division and Brigade space material capabilities are best demonstrated 
through the example of the ARSST and SSE equipment sets.  The prevailing 
concept at the tactical level is to provide a high bandwidth communications 
platform with computers capable of using image-processing software.  As the 
available bandwidth of military networks increases and availability of high data 
rate SIPR and JWICS in the tactical arena becomes more feasible, the reliance 
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on separate communications systems is less intense.  The main piece of 
equipment used by the SSE today is the laptop computer.   
5. Leadership and Personnel 
LTC Scherer’s thesis covers an overall Army perspective of space 
leadership and this thesis focuses primarily on tactical leadership impacts.  The 
two prevailing trends in FA40 tactical leadership follow in line with the ARSST 
and SSE structure.  One is centralized and standardized based on the ARSST 
model and the other depends on unit specific requirements and resources. 
All ARSSTs deployed and maintained throughout the Army come from the 
1st Space Brigade.  An O-6 Army Colonel commands the unit and chapter III-B 
details the structure of the brigade.  The 2nd Space Company is responsible for 
both the active duty ARSSTs and CETs.  Reserve space teams are also found 
within the 1st Space Brigade in the 3rd and 5th Space Companies.  The Space 
Company manages deployments, ensures training, and maintains equipment 
used for their mission.  The organic leadership of the Space Company and the 
entire Brigade provides a chain of command that supports the teams. 
Space Support Elements typically consist of two FA40 officers as shown in 
section III.  Utilization of the FA40s within the Division falls upon the G3.  Within 
the Division G3 Current Operations section, the duties of the FA40 are 
determined.  Based on the study of FA40 utilization, when space requirements 
are clearly understood and needed the application of the SSE towards space can 
be as high as 100%.  This is evident in the study for the time period at the 
beginning of OIF/OEF.  When the requirements become less clear or when the 
employment of space products/services has been routinely incorporated into 
current operations, as in the case of more recent years of OEF/OIF, application 
of SSEs away from space is seen.  The key ingredient for either scenario is 
leadership knowledge of potential space applications.  In well-defined activities, 
leadership can see the space contribution.  In steady state operations, the space 
contribution is less apparent.  In these less apparent examples, it is incumbent 
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on the FA40 to understand areas they can impact operations and to make other 
staff elements aware.  The lack of space understanding is an organizational 
issue that requires continual effort by both SMDC and the FA40 SSE community 
in direct interaction with Division leadership to resolve.  In situations where 
minimal space capabilities are required, and an FA40 is not needed, another staff 
officer with a 3Y identifier could satisfy the unit’s space requirements. 
In Brigade sized units, the presence of an FA40 is rarely effective.  There 
is simply not enough of a requirement for space capabilities to warrant an O-4 
FA40 to be assigned there.  The FA40 typically is assigned to special projects or 
staff duties well outside the boundaries of space operations.  The fielding of FCS 
BCTs with FA40 officers is not an effective use of those personnel.  Staff officers 
or NCOs with 3Y identifiers can easily accomplish the limited space requirements 
in the BCTs with no loss to the unit and a more effective reallocation of the FA40. 
Assessing the leadership aspect of the Division and Brigade FA40 is a 
two-sided argument.  Originally, the SSEs were placed in the Divisions so that 
they would have a space asset organic to the unit for both deployment and 
garrison purposes.  The logic behind the decision rests with the concept that 
ARSST support was so effective that a full-time space team would provide the 
same level of service for the unit all the time.  From the Division point of view, 
having organic space assets for the occasional requirement justifies their 
constant presence.  The other side of the argument involves the concept of 
maintaining the proficiency of a highly trained work force.  Following a space-
centric academic training program an SSE team member is assigned for two-
years to a Division staff.  They may not retain all of the space-related knowledge 
an FA40 assigned to either an ARSST or another space job would.  The specifics 
of each SSE FA40 may be different, but the concept of taking a technically skilled 
individual completely out of their environment for two years with the expectation 
they can reassume those duties once complete is difficult to manage.  A more 
effective use of those personnel would be to readdress the assignment process 
for SSEs and consider other alternatives.  
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E. BETTER METHODS 
1. Leadership Education 
Integrating space into everyday operations no longer requires the 
continual presence of space staff at the Division and Brigade levels.  Education 
of both leadership and staff elements is vital in transitioning the Army to a fully 
integrated world of organic space support.  As space becomes more practiced 
and routine, non-FA40 personnel can fulfill the minimal space related actions 
required.  Understanding that extra capabilities exist with more robust space 
teams, such as ARSSTs, commanders can use their organic personnel knowing 
that all of their future requirements will be met.  For example, the intelligence 
analyst can do their primary job and obtain space products as needed.  When the 
need for expanded capabilities is identified, the 1st Space Brigade can fulfill those 
needs.  By empowering leaders and staff with a grasp of what space can do at 
their level, they can make better decisions about when they need space assets 
and new ways to use SOO skills.  
To augment the Division staff and unit level training, the institution of 
training teams could demonstrate space effects in training environments.  A team 
of FA40 trainers located at the major training centers such as the National 
Training Center (NTC) or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) could 
inject space into exercise planning and operations.  The opportunity for tactical 
staff elements to employ space products in realistic exercise scenarios would 
greatly enhance their confidence in using those products.  Additionally, First 
Army training centers for Reserve and National Guard units could incorporate 
space education and exercise effects into mobilization plans.  The result could 
have a two-fold benefit of educating combat leaders and training staff elements 
to better use space products. 
 
 66
2. Broaden the Space Cadre 
The intent of pushing FA40s down to Division and BCT levels in the form 
of the SSE is to provide space capabilities organically.  Despite the high 
percentage of filled authorized positions, using FA40s for less than one-third of 
the time is not efficient.  Those personnel could be better utilized within the upper 
echelon Army space cadre overseeing existing programs, educating the force, 
working on inter-service systems, increasing ARSST capabilities, and developing 
the next generation of space assets.  To fill the Division or BCT Commander’s 
occasional requirement for space the unit could utilize existing staff elements, 
such as the G3 or G6, with 3Y identifiers and focused training to provide space 
products.  If a major deployment requires additional space support, an ARSST 
could be requested.  Reallocating FA40s from SSEs to ARSSTs would 
significantly increase the availability of resources. 
Several enlisted specialties are involved in space capabilities, but no 
single occupational specialty mirrors the FA40.  Developing an enlisted FA40 
would greatly enhance the ability to spread space knowledge around the Army.  
An enlisted FA40 could be assigned to virtually any level of unit and bring 
expertise that no single intelligence or communications Soldier could provide.  In 
comparison to the other services, only the Air Force has a permanent officer 
space specialty similar to the FA40, and they also maintain an enlisted space 
force.  The Army enlisted personnel currently working the space field are 
considered “space enablers” and they come from MI, Signal, ADA, and Engineer 
enlisted branches.  Some possess the 3Y identifier and work in space-related 
jobs, but no standardized career field exists.  In his article “An Enlisted Space 
Cadre,” CSM David Lady noted that many enlisted who worked in space related 
jobs had little or no formal space education and were forced to pick up skills on-
the-job.  There are over 1000 enlisted Soldiers across active duty, the Reserves, 
and the National Guard currently working in the space field.110  Standardizing the 
                                            
110 Lady, 8. 
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training and developing the space career field would greatly enhance the training 
of those Soldiers already doing the job and provide a commonly trained resource 
to propagate space throughout the Army.  
3. Emphasize the ARSST 
The ARSST represents an ideal tactical space asset.  The personnel 
assigned to ARSST units remain well submersed in space activities and ensure a 
high degree of proficiency for deploying units.  Contrasted with the minimally 
used space skills of the SSE, the ARSST brings a suite of space equipment and 
the backing of the 1st Space Brigade’s space resources.  To provide the tactical 
commander the best possible space expertise, focus tactical space on 1st Space 
Brigade’s ARSST Model.  To achieve this, take SSEs out of Division and BCTs 
and use them to supply personnel for an additional five active duty ARSSTs.  The 
application of 3Y staff officers and enlisted FA40s in the Divisions and BCTs 
ensure the unit has continual space capabilities.  With these additional ARSSTs 
the ability to provide space assets to twice as many deploying units is possible.  
The more side-jobs the SSE guys get, the less space they remember. 
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There are wide varieties of space assets available to the tactical 
commander at the Division or BCT level.  The Army Space Cadre provides the 
commander satellite communications that enable worldwide connectivity, GPS-
based technologies that enable unsurpassed situational awareness, and 
intelligence platforms that provide strategic products at the tactical level.  The 
impact of these resources has been dramatic on the conduct of war in the 
modern era.   
In parallel to the development of space systems, the Army instituted a 
space personnel structure to provide expertise as well.  The growth of the FA40 
career field enabled space access to tactical units in the form of the ARSST and 
the SSE.  ARSST teams are attached to a deploying unit and provide space 
products while deployed and an SSE is an organic space resource for both 
Division and Brigade units.  Though both are staffed with FA40 personnel, the 
actual space-related workload varies significantly.  ARSST members work within 
space related duties the majority of the time where SSE members work with 
space can vary from zero to an average of 30%.  Initially designed to provide the 
capability of an ARSST to a Division or Brigade commander in an organic asset, 
the SSE does not represent an efficient use of FA40 personnel.  
B. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
A tactical commander whether at the Division, Brigade, or Company level 
has requirements for information that can be potentially met in many ways.  
Although they may desire organically assigned space personnel, the requirement 
may be adequately met through the use of other sources.  Due to the 
documented lack of space-related utilization of many of the FA40s working at 
Division levels or below a more efficient method of providing space capabilities is 
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necessary.  To facilitate a balance between the space needs of the Army in 
general and the tactical needs of the commander there are three general 
recommendations for improved support. 
 The first recommendation is to establish a training plan within SMDC to 
reach out to Division leadership and staff to educate them on what space can 
provide.  In conjunction with this training, there should be an addition to the 
Tactical Space Operations Course curriculum to include methods to help SSE 
officers communicate space effectively to their leadership.  This curriculum 
addition would assist newly assessed FA40s in identifying areas where space 
can contribute and better ways to work those items into unit operations. 
The second recommendation is to alter the Army Space Cadre concept.   
Personnel with 3Y identifiers should be used at Division and BCT commands in 
lieu of FA40s.  These pre-existing G/S-2 and G/S-6 personnel can fulfill the 
occasional space requirements while allowing FA40 personnel to remain involved 
in more space-intensive occupations.  Also, an FA40 enlisted specialty should be 
established.  Enlisted from several different specialties currently work in the 
space field with no formal space training.  Standardizing enlisted space training 
and developing a career field similar to the FA40 would not only ensure a more 
qualified work force, but would add an element of flexibility to spread space 
expertise around the Army.  
The third and final recommendation is to gear the tactical space support 
model after the ARSST.  Reallocating SSE FA40s would provide the personnel to 
build an additional five active duty ARSSTs.  With these new teams, twice as 
many space support opportunities would exist.  Additionally, the continual focus 
of ARSSTs on space-related training and equipment would ensure the most 
qualified space expertise available for the tactical commander.  This change in 
structure would ensure that the total FA40 force remained well trained and the 
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